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Summary
The insurance industry faces an estimated $40 billion to $70 billion in claims tied
to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, and it remains exposed to significant risk from possible future terrorist acts.  As
a result of these events, insurance companies have become reluctant to provide
insurance against losses arising from possible terrorist attacks, and are seeking
exclusions for terrorism coverage in many policies, including commercial lines, and
personal automobile, homeowners, and group life.  This threatened lack of terrorism
coverage in commercial and personal insurance policies could have a significant
impact on a broad range of businesses and personal consumers.
  
The Bush Administration, insurance trade associations, and Members of
Congress have made various proposals to establish a federal “backstop” of the private
insurance (reinsurance) mechanism for the peril of terrorism.  A federal backstop
would involve taxpayer funds through loans or direct assistance to pay claims
resulting from future terrorist attacks.  
With time running out before Congress adjourns for the year, finding consensus
on the design of a mechanism for insuring terrorism risks has been difficult.  On
November 29, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3210, largely along party lines.  Action
now turns to the Senate, where several Senators have introduced competing bills.
Should Congress not pass legislation and state insurance regulators not allow
terrorism exclusions from commercial and personal policies, insurers could face
serious financial consequences.  
This report discusses and compares the House bill and three competing Senate
bills – S. 1743, S. 1744, and S. 1751.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Introduction
The insurance industry faces an estimated $40 billion to $70 billion in claims tied
to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, and it remains exposed to significant risk from possible future terrorist acts.1
As a result of these events, insurance companies have become reluctant to provide
insurance against losses arising from future terrorist attacks, and are seeking
exclusions for terrorism coverage in many policies, including commercial lines, and
personal automobile, homeowners, and group life.  This threatened lack of terrorism
coverage in commercial and personal insurance policies could have a significant
impact on a broad range of businesses and personal consumers.  
The Bush Administration, insurance trade associations, and Members of
Congress have made various proposals to establish a federal “backstop” of the private
insurance (reinsurance) mechanism for the peril of terrorism.2  A federal backstop
would involve taxpayer funds through loans or direct assistance to pay claims
resulting from future terrorist attacks.  With time running out before Congress
adjourns for the year, however, finding consensus on the design of a mechanism for
insuring terrorism risks has been difficult.  On November 29, 200, the House passed
H.R. 3210, largely along party lines, by a vote of 227 to 193.  Action now turns to the
Senate, where several Senators have introduced competing bills (S. 1743, S. 1744 and
S. 1751).  A major point of contention are proposal that would prohibit victims of
future terrorist acts from collecting punitive damages from building or business
owners.3  Should Congress not pass legislation and state insurance regulators not
allow terrorism exclusions from commercial policies, insurers could face serious
financial consequences.4
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Insuring Future Terrorist Acts
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, major reinsurers announced that they would no longer cover acts
of terrorism in their reinsurance contracts with primary insurers.  Reinsurance is
generally written on a one-year basis, and approximately 70% of commercial
insurance policies expire on December 31, 2001.  If primary insurance companies
cannot obtain reinsurance for the risk of terrorism going forward, many have indicated
that they intend to exclude it specifically from future policies.5  The unavailability of
terrorism risk insurance could impede the ability of lenders to finance commercial
property acquisitions and new construction, and thus impair the nation’s economic
recovery.  Insurers want the federal government to provide last resort reinsurance
coverage or facilitate its provision in the private sector. 
Insurers have threatened to withdraw from writing terrorism coverage for two
reasons.  First, they want to limit their capital base from the exposure to very  large
future terrorism-related claims, and possible rating downgrades by rating agencies.
Insurers claim they cannot afford another payout of the kind incurred on September
11th.  They indicate that they did not anticipate risks related to acts of terrorism on
that scale and, therefore, did not collect sufficient premiums (or establish loss
reserves) to cover liabilities for terrorism specifically.6  Mindful of their ultimate loss
exposures relative to their capital strength, some insurers could invoke the “act of
war” exclusions in regard to new attacks in the United States, even though the
industry has so far been unanimous in not invoking that exclusion for claims stemming
from the September 11th events. 
Second, with some $150 billion in statutory capital backed by a global
reinsurance base of about $250 billion, the problem for the U.S. commercial property
and casualty industry is not one of solvency; rather, it is one of  uncertainty and
difficulty of the underwriting and pricing of future terrorism risks without distorting
markets.7  This uncertainty stems from  insurers’ inadequate understanding of the
characteristics of terrorist risks for events on the scale of September 11th, and the
likelihood of another occurrence, as well as the potential magnitude of possible future
acts of  terrorism.  If insurers cannot actuarially predict losses, based on past
experience, then they will have great difficulty in setting appropriate premiums.
Under these circumstances, insurers are likely either not to provide coverage or to be
highly selective in providing coverage.
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Legislative Proposals
To address potential reinsurance capacity shortage, particularly in commercial
property insurance, congressional committees are considering several proposals for
a federal backstop to maintain a market for terrorism risk insurance.  Table 1 provides
a comparison of terrorism risk insurance legislative proposals.  There is not yet a
consensus proposal. 
Terrorism Risk Protection Act (H.R. 3210)  
On November 29, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3210, the
Terrorism Risk Protection Act (TARPA).  H.R. 3210 provides for the establishment
of a temporary risk-sharing government loan program to cover 90% (after $5 million
deductible) of terrorism-related insured losses of commercial insurers above $1 billion
for the entire industry (or lesser amounts if individual insurers are particularly affected
as specified by the bill – i.e., losses from terrorism exceed 10% of the capital surplus
and 10% of the net premium for an individual commercial insurer).  Federal financial
assistance to commercial property and casualty insurers would be in the form of a
repayable loan, rather than direct terrorist disaster assistance.  The program would be
administered by the Secretary of the Treasury.  
 Claims paid by Treasury would be repaid through charges assessed on insurers
and purchasers (surcharges) of commercial property and casualty insurance.
Specifically, if covered losses were to exceed $20 billion, insurers could recoup part
of their costs through a premium surcharge of up to 3% on commercial policyholders.
Under H.R. 3210 there would be a “deductible” in 2002, which could be as low as
$100 million.
 
The bill also includes liability modifications provisions that would preclude
punitive damage awards from being levied on defendants who were not involved in
terrorist acts and limit defendants’ liability for non-economic damages to their portion
of responsibility.  The program would end December 31, 2002, but could be extended
to 2004.
National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act (S. 1743)
S. 1743 would create a temporary (three year) reinsurance fund administered by
the Secretary of Commerce through which participating commercial insurers would
pay assessments and receive federal reinsurance protection against losses related to
acts of terrorism.  The fund and its assessment mechanisms would provide the first
$50 billion of protection for the insurance industry.  All terrorism-related events that
result in losses beyond $50 billion would qualify for a direct federal grant program.
On an individual company basis, a trigger of 10% of premiums would apply, after
which an insurer could apply for assistance from the fund and the federal government.
In the first year, the fund would cover up to 90% of an insurer’s losses.  For the
second and third years, the fund would cover up to 80% of that insurers’ losses.  The
maximum insured losses covered by the fund would be $100 billion.  The bill does not
include a liability modification provision.
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Terrorism Insurance Act (S. 1744)
S. 1744 would create a temporary (two year) industry risk-sharing commercial
terrorism insurance program under the auspices of the Secretary of Commerce.
Commercial insurers would submit to either the Commerce Secretary or National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) information on the aggregate
premium amount of terrorism coverage written.  Should  the Commerce Secretary
determine that a commercial insurer’s annual insured losses for covered lines resulting
from acts of terrorism occurring in 2002 and 2003 exceeded the greater of $10 million
or 5% of gross written premiums, the government would pay 80% of those losses, up
to an aggregate industry limit of $100 billion.  Insurers would repay the first $50
billion in insured losses through terrorism loss repayment surcharges, which would be
limited to 6% of policyholder’s annual premium.  The surcharge would be imposed
on all covered lines, which could be broad enough to apply even to insurers who
excluded terrorism from coverage.  The bill includes a prohibition on punitive
damages arising from an act of terrorism, except for the terrorists who perpetrated the
act.  
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (S. 1751)
S. 1751 would create a temporary public/private federal reinsurance program
under the auspices the Secretary of Treasury, who would be authorized to develop
regulations to implement the program, as well as to investigate and audit all claims.
In the first two years, the industry would pay the first $10 billion of insured losses
related to acts of terrorism, and then 10% of losses above $10 billion;  the
government would pay the remaining 90%.  Should the program be extended for a
third year, then 90% of insurers’ losses in excess of the first $20 billion would be paid
by the Treasury.  The aggregate insured losses would be $100 billion.  The program
would be terminated on December 31, 2003, unless the  Secretary of Treasury were
to extend it one year to December 31, 2004.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislative Proposals 
 (As of December 5, 2001)
Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Sponsor Sen. Gramm, Enzi,
Bennett, Bunning,
Allard
Reps. Armey/Oxley/Baker Sen. Hollings, Boxer, Wyden Sen. McCain
Program Name Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act
Terrorism Risk Protection Act National Terrorism Reinsurance Fund Act Terrorism Insurance Act
Purpose Provide a temporary
public/private program
for losses resulting from
terrorism
Provide a temporary loan program Provide additional reinsurance capacity to
participating insurers for losses due to acts
of terrorism
Provide federal assistance and create a
temporary industry risk sharing program
Type of Entity Terrorism Insured Loss
Sharing Compensation
Program
Federal Risk Sharing Loan Program National Terrorism Reinsurance Program Temporary Industry Risk Sharing Program
Form of Governance Secretary of Treasury Secretary of Treasury would provide
oversight
Secretary of Commerce with advice





None None Yes.  Makes payments under
reinsurance contracts under the Act
and pays expenses of the NTRP and
interest payments on funds  borrowed
from the Treasury. Administrative
expenses could not exceed $5 million
for  fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004.
None
Underwriting Standards None None Yes. Minimum underwriting








Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Submission of Premium Data No. But Treasury
Secretary has access
to books and records.
Yes.  Insurers must submit to
Treasury Secretary or to the NAIC
data on net premiums written under
each line of commercial property and
casualty insurance in previous year.
No.  Reinsurance premiums
established by Commerce Secretary.
Yes.  Insurers must submit to Treasury
Secretary or NAIC information on
premiums on each commercial line.
Funding of NTRP NA NA Treasury provides a $2 billion start-up
loan.  Repayment of loan comes from
premium assessments on participating
insurers.  In addition, insurers would
pay into the fund an annual
reinsurance contract premium up to
3% of gross direct written premiums. 
Insurers allowed to recover contract
premium and annual assessment from
surcharge (calculated as a uniform
percentage of premiums charged) on
covered lines from policyholders. 






concurrence with the 
Secretary of State and
the Attorney General
Treasury Secretary in consultation
with Attorney General and Secretary
of State decides if acts are acts that
fall within the definition of terrorism
or war and whether acts occurred
during covered period.    
Commerce Secretary determines if
loss is attributable to terrorism. 
Determination subject to judicial
review.
Secretary of Commerce 
Length of Program 2 years, may be
extended to a 3rd year
1 year, may be extended 2 additional
years.





Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Trigger Industry-wide losses
exceed $10 billion in
years 2002, 2003,
then $20 billion if
program extended to
2004.
Industry-wide losses exceed $1
billion; individual insurer trigger
exceeds $100 million and some
portion of such losses for any single
commercial insurer exceed  10% of
capital surplus and 10% of net 
premiums written in force at time the
insured losses occurr.
Individual Insurer: Losses in excess of
10% of average gross direct written
premium and policyholders’ surplus
for covered lines.
Individual Insurer: If losses exceed the
greater of $10 million or 5% of gross
premiums on covered lines




Upon a triggering event, financial
assistance shall be made available as
follows: individual insurer deductible
of $5 million then financial assistance
at 90/10 of insured losses
Over trigger, insurer is reimbursed at
90% in 2002: 90%in 2003 if
assessment of 4% is paid: 80% if
assessment of 3% is paid, and 70% if
assessment of 2% is paid, up to $50
billion total fund reimbursement for
all participating insurers.






$100 billion; losses exceeding this
amount would necessitate action by
Congress
Over $50 billion, 90% in 2002, 80%





Commercial Commercial/Personal (optional)  Commercial
Mandatory Coverage Yes No Yes No
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Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Assessment None Treasury Secretary would impose levy
assessment up to 3% of premium
against all commercial insurers, based
on percentage of aggregate written
premiums for calendar year preceding
the assessment.  Secretary first
determines aggregate assessment
which shall be the lesser of $20
billion and total amount of financial
assistance.  Failure to pay assessment
could result in civil monetary penalty
or interest payment.





None If aggregate industry-wide losses
exceed $20 billion, Secretary of
Treasury shall establish and impose a
policyholder premium surcharge (3%
or premium) on commercial insurers
for purposes of repaying the balance
of the financial assistance provided. 
Commercial insurers are to charge,
collect, and remit surcharge to the
Treasury Secretary.  
None Yes.  To repay the first $50 billion in
2002 and in 2003, but limited to 6% of
policyholder’s annual premium.  Also
imposed on all covered lines (this could
be broad enough to apply even if insurer
excluded terrorism from coverage).
Considers economic impact
and risk factors of premium
assessment and policyholder
surcharge on commercial
centers in urban and rural
areas
No Yes No No
When Is Repayment Made? No repayment In year following the triggering
determination.  Treasury 
Secretary could defer the payment or
part or all of the assessment by an
individual commercial insurer to
avoid the likely insolvency of the
insurer.
In year following triggering
determination
Timing is up to Secretary of Commerce
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Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Civil Monetary Penalties NA $1 million for failing to pay
assessment or surcharge or providing
Treasury erroneous information





Treasury Secretary may issue any
regulations to carry out the Act.
Participating insurers must report
terrorism coverage to state insurance
regulators and obtain a certification
from regulator.  State regulator sends
copy of certification to Commerce
Secretary. 
Secretary of Commerce




authorities, offshore and  non-
admitted insurers and
reinsurers




Yes.  By Treasury Secretary consults
with NAIC.
Includes risk retention group or other
authorized residual market
mechanism.
Yes. By Commerce Secretary in
consultation with NAIC
Deductibility of loss reserves
for future acts of terrorism 
No Treasury shall conduct a study of
issues surrounding amending IRC of
1986 to establish tax-favored loss
reserves for future acts of terrorism. 
Submit study to Congress 120 days
after enactment of bill.
No No
Definition of Terrorism Yes. But must be in





Sense of Congress that the NAIC, in
consultation  with the Treasury
Secretary, should develop definitions
for acts of terrorism and standards for
making determinations concerning
terrorist acts, which should be
adopted by all states and by the
Administrator.
Made by Secretary of Commerce Yes. Determination by Secretary of
Commerce based on requirements in Act
plus any additional further specified after
consultation with NAIC
Disclosure of Pricing of
Terrorism Coverage 
No disclosure
required, would fall to
states.
Sense of Congress that states should
require separate disclosure of price of
terrorism coverage, assessments or
surcharges.
Must file premium with state and
identify terrorism portion.
Sense of Congress that states should
require separate disclosure, including
surcharges.
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Yes, with respect to financial
assistance, assessments, surcharges,
and investigating and auditing
claims.




state guidelines for coverage







Yes.  States required to adopt uniform
definitions and underwriting
standards for acts of terrorism
developed by the NAIC, in
consultation with the Treasury
Secretary. 
No, for state laws as to coverage and
financial requirements not applicable
to contracts entered into by the fund.
Yes, NAIC, in consultation with 
Secretary of Commerce, and each state









Exclusive remedy for claims
connecting to acts of terrorism that
resulted in insured losses will be a
federal right of action.  Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation will
designate  one or more district courts
that will have exclusive jurisdiction.
None None
Punitive Damages Prohibited Prohibited.  With respect to pain and
suffering and other non-economic
damages, each defendant shall only
be liable for the share of damages for
which that defendant is responsible. 
U.S. shall have a right of subrogation
with respect to any claim paid by the
U.S.  Attorneys fees limited to 20% of
damages or 20% of any court-
approved settlement.  Plaintiff’s
recovery reduced by amount of
collateral source compensation.  Also,
U.S. may seek protective orders to
prevent disclosure of classified
information.
No provision, thus would be allowed
as in any other court action, federal or
state.
Prohibited except against a defendant
who committed the act of terrorism.
Life Insurance Industry Study Yes Seven-member commission





No Yes No No
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Provision S. 1751 H.R. 3210 S. 1743 S. 1744 
Reports from Insurers None required, except
as to claims
None required Yes. Quarterly reports submitted to
Commerce Secretary, FTC, and GAO
Yes. To the extent such information is
not otherwise available. Aggregate
premium of each commercial line per
request of Secretary of Commerce.
Study of Reinsurance Pool
System for Future Acts of
Terrorism
No Yes No No
State Preemption Yes, as to definition
of “terrorism,” prior
approval rating




State “prior approval” rate regulation
laws with respect to increasing
premium rates to recover any
assessments (imposed by the Treasury
Secretary) are preempted. 
Requirements for filing and
subsequent review are not preempted.  
Does not supersede or preempt state
law that prohibits unfair methods of
competition in commerce, unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, or unfair insurance claims
practices.
Yes. As to regulation of insurance for
acts of terrorism, including initial rates,
but not subsequent review of rates by
states.
Source: Congressional Research Service
